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DUGALD STEWART'S WORKS, 




WITH ADDITIONS. 




OUR DUTIES TO GOJD. 




Selected, Prepared and Published 




BY 




ROSS WINANS. 




BALTIMORE: 
JOHN P. DES FOEGES. 

1 1872. 

F 



*V 4 



GLEANINGS 



FKOM 



Dugald Stewart's Works, with Additions. 



OUR DUTIES TO GOD. 

The study of philosophy in all its various 
branches, both natural and moral, affords at 
every step a new illustration of the subject to 
which these investigations relate, insomuch that 
the truths of natural religion gain an accession 
of evidence from every addition that is made to 
the stock of human knowledge. 

In considering the universe with a view to 
the illustration of the wisdom and unity of 
God, it is, in a peculiar degree, satisfactory to 
trace the relations which different parts of it 
bear to each other, and to remark the concur- 
rence of things, apparently unconnected and 
even remote, in promoting the same benevolent 
purposes. 



The adaptation of the bodies and of the in- 
stincts of animals to those particular climates 
and districts of the earth for which they are 
destined. 

The relations subsisting between particular 
animals and particular vegetables ; the latter 
furnishing to the former salutary food in their 
healthful state and useful remedies in the case 
of disease. 

The relations which different tribes of ani- 
mals bear to each other, one tribe being the 
natural prey of another, and each of them hav- 
ing their instruments of offence or defence pro- 
vided accordingly. 

The relations which the periodical instincts 
of migrating animals bear to the state of the 
season, and to the vegetable productions of dis- 
tant parts of the globe. 

This view of the subject is peculiarly striking 
when we consider the relations which subsist 
between the nature of man and the circum- 
stances of his external situation. An examina- 
tion of his perceptive faculties in particular, 
and of his intellectual powers as they are adapt- 
ed to the structure and to the laws of the 
material world, opens a wide field of curious 
speculation. 

The accommodation of the objects around 



him to his appetites, to his physical wants, and 
to his capacities of enjoyment, is no less won- 
derful, and exceeds so far what we observe in 
the case of other animals as to authorize us to 
conclude that it was chiefly with a view to his 
happiness and improvement that the arrange- 
ments of this lower world were made. 

Interesting as these physical speculations 
may be, it is still more delightful to trace the 
uniformity of design which is displayed in the 
moral world ; to compare the arts of human life 
with the instincts of the brutes, and the in- 
stincts of the different tribes of brutes with 
each other ; and to remark, amidst the aston- 
ishing variety of means which are employed to 
accomplish the same ends, a certain analogy 
characterize them all, or to observe, in the 
minds of different individuals of our own spe- 
cies, the workings of the same affections and 
passions, and to trace the uniformity of their 
operation in men of different ages and coun- 
tries. It is this which gives the great charm 
to what we call nature in epic and dramatic 
composition, when the poet speaks a language 
to which every heart is an echo, and which, 
amidst all the effects of education and fashion 
in modifying and disguising the principles of 
our constitution, reminds all the various classes 



6 

of readers or of spectators of the existence of 
those moral ties which unite us to each other 
and to our common Parent. 



OF THE EVIDENCES OF BENEVOLENT 
DESIGN IN THE UNIVERSE. 

Oue ideas of the moral attributes of God 
must be derived from our own moral percep- 
tions. It is only by attending to these that we 
can form a conception of what His attributes 
are, and it is in this way we are furnished with 
the strongest proofs that they really belong to 
Him. 

The peculiar sentiment of approbation with 
which we regard the virtue of beneficence in 
others, and the peculiar satisfaction with which 
we reflect on such of our own actions as have 
contributed to the happiness of mankind — to 
which we may add the exquisite pleasure ac- 
companying the exercise of all the kind affec- 
tions — naturally lead us to consider benevo- 
lence or goodness as the supreme attribute of 
the Deity. It is difficult, indeed, to conceive 
what other motive could have induced a Being, 



completely and independently happy, to have 
called His creatures into existence. 

In this manner, without any examination of 
the fact, we have a strong presumption for the 
goodness of the Deity, and it is only after estab- 
lishing this presumption a priori that we can 
proceed to examine the fact with safety. It is 
true, indeed, that, independently of this pre- 
sumption, the disorders we see would not dem- 
onstrate ill intention in the Author of the uni- 
verse, as it would still be possible that these 
might contribute to the happiness and the per- 
fection of the whole system. 

The Manicheans account for the mixture of 
good and evil in the universe by the opposite 
agencies of two co-eternal and independent prin- 
ciples. Their doctrine has been examined and 
refuted by many authors by reasoning a pri- 
ori ; but the most satisfactory of all refutations 
is its obvious inco.nsistency with that unity of 
design which is everywhere conspicuous in na- 
ture. 

The fundamental principle of the Optimists is 
that all events are ordered for the best, and that 
the evils which we suffer are parts of a great 
system conducted by almighty power under the 
direction of infinite wisdom and goodness. 

Under this general title, however, are com- 



8 

prehended two very different descriptions of 
philosophers, those who admit and those who 
deny the freedom of human actions. The 
former only contend that everything is right 
so far as it is the work of God, and endeavor 
to show that the creation of beings endowed 
with free will, and consequently liable to moral 
delinquency — and the government of the world 
by general laws, from which occasional evils 
must result — furnish no solid objection to the 
perfection of the universe. 

But they hold, at the same time, that al- 
though the permission of moral evil does not 
detract from the goodness of God, it is never- 
theless imputable to man as a fault, and ren- 
ders him justly obnoxious to punishment. This 
was the system of Plato, and of the best of the 
ancient philosophers, who, in most instances, 
state their doctrine in a manner perfectly con- 
sistent with man's free will and moral agency. 

All the different subjects of human complaint 
may be reduced to two classes : moral and 
physical evils. The former comprehends those 
which arise from the abuse of free will ; the 
latter, those which result from the established 
laws of nature, and which man cannot prevent 
by his own efforts. 

According to the definition now given of 



moral evil, the question with respect to its 
permission is reduced to this : Why was man 
made a free agent ? A question to which it 
seems to be a sufficient reply : That perhaps 
the object of the Deity in the government of 
the world is not merely to communicate happi- 
ness, but to form His creatures to moral excel- 
lence, or that the enjoyment of high degrees of 
happiness may perhaps necessarily require the 
previous acquisition of virtuous habits. 

The sufferings produced by vice are, on this 
supposition, instances of the goodness of God, 
no less than the happiness resulting from virtue. 

These observations justify Providence, not 
only for the permission of moral evil, but for 
the permission of many things which we com- 
monly complain of as physical evils. How 
great is the proportion of these, which we com- 
monly complain of as physical evils. How 
great is the proportion of these, which are the 
obvious consequences of our vices and our pre- 
judices, and which, so far from being a neces- 
sary part of the order of nature, seem intended 
to operate in the progress of human affairs as a 
gradual remedy against the causes which pro- 
duce them. 

Some of our other complaints with respect to 
the lot of humanity will be found, on examina- 



10 

tion, to arise from partial views of the constitu- 
tion of man, and from a want of attention to 
the circumstances which constitute his happi- 
ness or promote his improvement. 

Thus it appears not only, that partial evils 
may be good with respect to the whole system, 
but that their tendency is beneficial on the 
whole, even to that small part of it which we 
see. 

The distinction between right and wrong is 
apprehended by the mind to be eternal and im- 
mutable, no less than the distinction between 
mathematical truth and falsehood. To argue, 
therefore, from our own moral judgments to 
the administration of the Deity, cannot be 
justly censured as a rash extension to the 
Divine nature of suggestions resulting from the 
arbitrary constitution of our own minds. 

The power we have of conceiving this dis- 
tinction is one of the most remarkable of those 
which raise us above the brutes, and the sense 
of obligation which it involves possesses a dis- 
tinguished pre-eminence over all our other prin- 
ciples of action. To act in conformity to our 
sense of rectitude is plainly the highest excel- 
lence which our nature is capable of attaining, 
nor can we avoid extending the same rule of 
estimation to all intelligent beings whatever. 



11 

Besides these conclusions with respect to the 
Divine attributes — which seem to be implied 
in our very perception of moral distinctions — 
there are others, perfectly agreeable to them, 
which continually force themselves on the mind 
in the exercise of our moral judgments, both 
with respect to our own conduct and that of 
other men. The reverence which we feel to 
be due to the admonitions of conscience ; the 
sense of merit and demerit which accompanies 
our good and bad actions ; the warm interest 
we take in the fortunes of the virtuous ; the 
indignation we feel at the occasional triumphs 
of successful villainy : all imply a secret con- 
viction of the moral administration of the uni- 
verse. 

An examination of the ordinary course of 
human affairs adds to the force of these consid- 
erations, and furnishes a proof from the fact 
that, notwithstanding the seemingly promis- 
cuous distribution of happiness and misery in 
this life, the reward of virtue and the punish- 
ment of vice are the great objects of all the 
general laws by which the world is governed. 
The disorders, in the meantime, — which, in 
such a world as ours, cannot fail to arise in 
particular instances when they are compared 
with our natural sense of good and of ill de- 



12 

sert- — afford a presumption that in a future 
state the moral government which we see be- 
gun here will be carried into complete execu- 
tion. 

After the view which has been given of the 
principles of natural religion, little remains to 
be added concerning the duties which respect 
the Deity. To employ our faculties in study- 
ing those evidences of power, of wisdom, and 
of goodness which He has displayed in His 
works, as it is the foundation in other instances 
of our sense of religious obligation, so it is in 
itself a duty incumbent on us as reasonable and 
moral beings, capable of recognising the exist- 
ence of an almighty cause and of feeling cor- 
responding sentiments of devotion. By those 
who entertain just opinions on this most im- 
portant of all subjects, the following practical 
consequences, which comprehend some of the 
chief effects of religion on the temper and con- 
duct, will be readily admitted as self-evident 
propositions. 

In the first place : If the Deity be pos- 
sessed of infinite moral excellence, we must 
feel towards Him, in an infinite degree, all 
those affections of love, gratitude, and confi- 
dence which are excited by the imperfect worth 



L3 



we observe among our fellow-creatures ; for it 
is by conceiving all that is benevolent and 
amiable in man, raised to the highest perfec- 
tion, that we can alone form some faint notion 
of the Divine nature. To cultivate, therefore, 
an habitual love and reverence of the Supreme 
Being, may be justly considered as the first 
great branch of morality ; nor is the virtue of 
that man complete, or even consistent with 
itself, in whose mind these sentiments of piety 
are wanting. 

Secondly : Although religion can with no 
propriety be considered as the sole foundation 
of morality, yet when we are convinced that 
God is infinitely good, and that He is the 
friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords 
the most powerful inducements to the practice 
of every branch of our duty. It leads us to 
consider conscience as the vicegerent of *God, 
and to listen to its suggestion as to the com- 
mands of that Being from whom we have re- 
ceived our existence, and the great object of 
whose government is to promote the happiness 
and the perfection of His whole creation. 

That the practice of veracity and justice, and 
of all our other duties, is useful to mankind, is 
acknowledged by moralists of all descriptions ; 
and there is good reason for believing that if a 



14 

person saw all the consequences of his actions, 
he would perceive that an adherence to their 
rules is useful and advantageous on the whole, 
even in those cases in which his limited views 
incline him to think otherwise. It is possible 
that in the Deity benevolence, or a regard to 
utility, may be the sole principle of action, and 
that the ultimate end for which He enjoined to 
His creatures the duties of veracity and justice 
was to secure their own happiness ; but still, 
with respect to man, they are indispensable 
laws, for he has an immediate perception of 
their rectitude. Where they are possessed in 
an eminent degree, we may perhaps consider 
them as a ground of moral esteem, because 
they indicate _ the pains which have been be- 
stowed on their cultivation, and a course of 
active virtue in which they have been exer- 
cised, and strengthened. 

In truth, all those offices, whether apparently 
trifling or important, by which the happiness 
of other men is affected — civility, gentleness, 
kindness, humanity, patriotism, universal be- 
nevolence — are only diversified expressions of 
the same disposition, according to the circum- 
stances'in which it operates and the relations 
which the agent bears to others. 



15 



OF VERACITY. 

The important rank which veracity holds 
among our social duties, appears from the ob- 
vious consequences that would result if no foun- 
dation were laid for it in the constitution of our 
nature. The purposes of speech would be frus- 
trated, and every man's opportunities of know- 
ledge would be limited to his own personal 
experience. 

Considerations of utility, however, do not 
seem to be the only ground of the approbation 
we bestow on this disposition. Abstracting 
from all regard to consequences, there is some- 
thing pleasing and amiable in sincerity, open- 
ness, and truth ; something disagreeable and 
disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and false- 
hood. 

That there is in the human mind a natural 
or instinctive principle of veracity has been 
remarked by many authors, the same part of 
our constitution which prompts to social inter- 
course prompting also to sincerity in our mu- 
tual communications. Truth is always the 
spontaneous and native expression of our sen- 
timents, whereas falsehood implies a certain 
violence done to our nature in consequence of 



16 

the influence of some motive which we are 
anxious to conceal. 

[Accordingly it is, remarked both by Reid 
and Smith, that the greatest liars, where they 
lie once, they speak truth a hundred times.] 

Corresponding to this instinctive principle of 
veracity, there is a principle — coeval with the 
use of language — determining us to repose 
faith in testimony. Without such a disposition 
the education of children would be impracti- 
cable ; and, accordingly, so far from being the 
result of experience, it seems to be, in the first 
instance, unlimited, nature intrusting its grad- 
ual correction to the progress of reason and ob- 
servation. It bears a striking analogy, both in 
its origin and in its final cause, to our instinct- 
ive expectation of the continuance of those laws 
which regulate the course of physical events. 

[As this principle presupposes the general 
practice of veracity, it may be regarded as an 
additional intimation of that conduct which is 
conformable to the end and destination of our 
being.] 

It would appear that every breach of veracity 
indicates some latent vice, or some criminal in- 
tention, which an individual is ashamed to 
avow. And hence the peculiar beauty of open- 
ness or sincerity, uniting, in some degree, in 



17 

itself, the graces of all the other moral qualities 
of which it attests the existence. 

The practice of veracity is secured, to a con- 
siderable extent, in modern Europe, by the 
received maxims of honor which brand with 
infamy every palpable deviation from the truth 
in matters of fact or in the fulfilment of prom- 
ises. Veracity, however, considered as a moral 
duty, is not confined to sincerity in the use of 
speech, but prohibits every circumstance in our 
external conduct which is calculated to mislead 
others by conveying to them false information. 
It prohibits, in like manner, the wilful employ- 
ment of sophistry in an argument, no less than 
a wilful misrepresentation of fact. The fash- 
ion of the times may establish distinctions in 
these different cases, but none of them are 
sanctioned by the principles of morality. 

The same disposition of mind which leads to 
the practice of veracity in our commerce with 
the world, cherishes the love of truth in our 
philosophical inquiries. This active principle, 
which is indeed but another name for the prin- 
ciple of curiosity, seems also to be an ultimate 
fact in the human frame. 

Although, however, in its first origin not 
resolvable into views of utility, the gradual dis- 
covery of its extensive effects on human im- 



provement cannot fail to confirm and to aug- 
ment its native influence on the mind. The 
connexion between error and misery, between 
truth and happiness, becomes more apparent as 
our researches proceed, producing at last a com- 
plete conviction that even in those cases where 
we are unable to trace it the connexion sub- 
sists, and encouraging the free and unbiassed 
exercise of our rational powers as an expression 
at once of benevolence to man and of confi- 
dence in the righteous administration of the 
universe. 

Prudence, temperance, and fortitude are no 
less requisite for enabling us to discharge our 
social duties than for securing our own private 
happiness. 

A steady regard, in the conduct of life, to 
the happiness and perfection of our own nature, 
and a diligent study of the means by which 
these ends may be attained, is another duty 
belonging to this branch of virtue. It is a 
duty so important and comprehensive, that it 
leads to the practice of all the rest ; and is 
therefore entitled to a very full and particular 
examination in a system of Moral Philosophy. 
Such an examination leads our thoughts " to the 
end and aim of our being.' ' 

That the principle of self-love — or, in other 



19 

words, the desire of happiness — is neither an 
object of approbation nor of blame, is suffici- 
ently obvious. It is inseparable from the nature 
of man, as a rational and a sensitive being. 

It is, however, no less obvious, on the other 
hand, that this desire, considered as a principle 
of action, has by no means a uniform influence 
on the conduct. 

Our animal appetites, our affections, and the 
other inferior principles of our nature, interfere 
as often with self-love as with benevolence, 
and mislead us from our own happiness as much 
as from the duties we owe to others. 

The most superficial observation of life is 
sufficient to convince us that happiness is not 
to be attained by giving every appetite and 
desire the gratification they demand, and that 
it is necessary for us to form to ourselves some 
plan or system of conduct in subordination to 
which all other objects are to be pursued. 

The Stoics placed the supreme good in rec- 
titude of conduct without any regard to the 
event. 

They did not, however, recommend an indif- 
ference to external objects, or a life of inactivity 
and apathy ; but on the contrary, they taught 
that nature pointed out to us certain objects of 
choice and rejection, and amongst these, some 
3 w 



20 

as more to be chosen and avoided than others ; 
and that virtue consisted in choosing and reject- 
ing objects according to their intrinsic value. 
They only contended that these objects should 
be pursued, not as the means of our happiness, 
but because we believe it to be agreeable to 
nature that we should pursue them, and that 
therefore when we have done our utmost, we 
should regard the event as indifferent. 

The scale of desirable objects exhibited in 
this system was peculiarly calculated to en- 
courage the social virtues. It taught that the 
prosperity of two was preferable to that of one, 
that of a city to that of a family, and that of 
our country to all partial considerations. On 
this principle, added to a sublime sentiment of 
piety, it founded its chief argument for an entire 
resignation to the dispensations of Providence. 
As all events are ordered by perfect wisdom 
and goodness, the Stoics concluded that what- 
ever happens is calculated to produce the great- 
est possible good to the universe in general. 

As it is agreeable, therefore, to nature that 
we should prefer the happiness of many to that 
of a few, and of all to that of many, they con- 
cluded that every event which happens is pre- 
cisely that which we ourselves would have de- 
sired if we had been acquainted with the whole 
scheme of the Divine administration. 



21 

While the Stoics held this elevated language, 
they acknowledged the weaknesses of humanity, 
but insisted that it is the business of the philo- 
sopher to delineate what is perfect, without 
lowering the dignity of virtue by limitations 
arising from the frailties of mankind. 

In the greater part of these opinions, the 
Peripatetics agreed with the Stoics. They ad- 
mitted that virtue ought to be the law of our 
conduct, and that no other good was to be com- 
pared to it ; but they did not represent it as the 
sole good, nor affect a total indifference to 
things external. 

Prom the slight view now given of the sys- 
tems of philosophers with respect to the sover- 
eign good, it may be assumed as an acknow- 
ledged and indisputable fact that happiness 
arises chiefly from the mind. The Stoics per- 
haps expressed this too strongly when they 
said that to a wise man external circumstances 
are indifferent. Yet it must be confessed that 
happiness depends much less on these than is 
commonly imagined ; and that as there is no 
situation so prosperous as to exclude the tor- 
ments of malice, cowardice and remorse, so 
there is none so adverse as to withhold the en- 
joyment of a benevolent, resolute, and upright 
heart. 



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